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Summary
On October 20-21, 2001, the Ninth APEC Leaders’ Meeting (summit) was
hosted by China in Shanghai.  President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, U.S. Trade
Representative Zoellick, Commerce Secretary Evans, and other members of the
Administration attended.  The office theme for APEC 2001 was “Meeting New
Challenges in the New Century: Achieving Common Prosperity through Participation
and Cooperation” with the sub-themes of:  (1) sharing the benefits of globalization
and the new economy, (2) advancing trade and investment, and (3) promoting
sustained economic growth.  The war on terrorism and slowing world economic
growth, however, dominated discussions.  The leaders’ statement on counter-
terrorism was the first time APEC dealt explicitly with a non-economic issue.  APEC
leaders also reaffirmed the goal of achieving free trade and investment among APEC
members and to provide support for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations
under the World Trade Organization.  The leaders also issued the Shanghai  Accord
in which they committed themselves to broaden APEC's vision for the future by
identifying a conceptual and policy framework to guide APEC in the new century.
The Accord included clarifying APEC's roadmap for achieving the free trade and
investment goals on schedule with an assessment of overall progress in 2005,
promoting the adoption of appropriate trade policies for the New Economy, following
up on the APEC Trade Facilitation Principles, pursuing greater transparency in
economic governance; and strengthening APEC's implementation mechanism.
APEC is an association of 21 economies bordering the Pacific Ocean who are
working cooperatively to reduce barriers to trade and investment; ease the exchange
of goods, services, resources, and technical know-how; and strengthen economic and
technical cooperation.  The members include the United States, Canada, Mexico,
Chile, Peru, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Brunei,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, and Russia. 
In the 1994 Bogor Declaration, the leaders of APEC declared their intention to
establish free trade and investment in the region by the year 2010 for industrialized
members and 2020 for the others.  This goal has been reaffirmed at the Leader’s
Meeting each subsequent year.
For the United States, APEC raises fundamental questions that are of special
interest to Congress.  One is whether consensus can be achieved on the APEC vision
of free trade and investment in the Asia Pacific or whether future trade liberalization
will be confined primarily to bilateral free-trade agreements or multilateral trade
negotiations under the World Trade Organization.  In the 107th Congress, APEC-
related legislation includes bills to provide trade promotion authority to the President
(H.R. 1446) and several that would establish free trade between the United States and
various APEC countries.  U.S. financial support for APEC in the State Department’s
budget has been $601,000 per year.
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Introduction
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is an association of 21
economies bordering the Pacific Ocean who are working cooperatively to reduce
barriers to trade and investment, facilitate the exchange of goods, services, resources,
and technical know-how, and strengthen economic and technical cooperation.  In
2000, APEC’s 21 member economies had a combined Gross Domestic Product of
over $19 trillion totaling about 48% of world exports.  The members of APEC have
declared their intention to establish free trade and investment in the region by the year
2010 for industrialized members and 2020 for the others. For the United States,
APEC has become a key institution for pursuing trade and investment liberalization
and facilitation in the Asia-Pacific region.
On October 20-21, 2001, the Ninth
APEC Leaders’ Meeting (summit) was held in
Shanghai, China.  President Bush, Secretary of
State Powell, U.S. Trade Representative
Zoellick, and other U.S. officials attended.
The Leaders’ Meeting was preceded by an
APEC Ministerial Meeting on October 17-18
and by a series of other meetings during the
year addressing various economic issues.
For 2001, China hosted the Leaders’ Meeting and, in consultation with other
APEC members, set the major agenda items.  The official theme for 2001 was
“Meeting New Challenges in the New Century: Achieving Common Prosperity
through Participation and Cooperation” with sub-themes of:  (1) sharing the benefits
of globalization and the new economy, (2) advancing trade and investment, and (3)
promoting sustained economic growth.  The war on terrorism and slowing world
economic growth, however, dominated discussions.  The leaders’ statement on
counter-terrorism was the first time APEC dealt explicitly with a non-economic issue.
In the statement, the leaders condemned the attacks on the United States, committed
themselves to preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorists acts in the future, to
enhance counter-terrorism cooperation, and take appropriate financial measures to
prevent the flow of funds to terrorists.1  APEC leaders also reaffirmed the goal of
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achieving free trade and investment among APEC members and strongly supported
the launch of the new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade
Organization.
At the Shanghai meeting, the leaders also issued the Shanghai  Accord in which
they committed themselves to broaden APEC's vision for the future by identifying a
conceptual and policy framework to guide APEC in the new century.  The Accord
included clarifying APEC's roadmap for achieving the free trade and investment goals
on schedule with an assessment of overall progress in 2005,  promoting the adoption
of appropriate trade policies for the New Economy, following up on the APEC Trade
Facilitation Principles, pursuing greater transparency in economic governance, and
strengthening APEC's implementation mechanism.2 
Representation by Taiwan at the Shanghai Leaders’ Meeting became an issue
when Beijing rejected Taiwan’s choice of former Vice President Li Yuan-zu to attend.
Beijing claimed that Mr. Li was not an economics official and consequently did not
extend an official invitation to Taiwan to participate.  The government of Taiwan
refused to select another representative and ultimately boycotted the meeting. 
 APEC has become the primary regional institution in the Asia-Pacific for
promoting open trade and practical economic cooperation.  It is of interest to
Congress because:
! it is becoming a vehicle for pursuing free trade and other initiatives
similar in their longer-term objectives to the goals pursued under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA);
! the APEC Leaders’ Meeting provides an opportunity for the U.S.
President to raise and discuss issues with the heads of other APEC
countries;
! any concrete trade or investment measures developed under APEC
that require a change in existing U.S. laws will need legislative
approval and may call for fast-track negotiating authority;
! the U.S. economy is linked to the economies of the Pacific rim
through trade, financial investment, and direct investment in
subsidiaries in the region; and
! in view of the intense debate over the effects of NAFTA, the
proposed creation of a free-trade arrangement that includes the
United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia,
Russia, Vietnam, and other Asian-Pacific nations could easily become
controversial.
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The goal of establishing free trade and investment among APEC nations is being
pursued along three tracks.  The first is through liberalizing trade in certain sectors
such as information technology.  These have been referred to the World Trade
Organization in order to bring European and other nations into the agreements and
are categorized at the WTO as early voluntary sectoral liberalization (EVSL).  The
second is through bilateral free trade agreements or by encouraging multilateral trade
negotiations under the WTO, and the third is through incremental liberalization
measures (individual action plans) taken by APEC members.
Thus far in the 107th Congress, APEC is potentially affected by several legislative
proposals.  Some trade liberalization under APEC arguably will require trade
promotion (fast-track) negotiating authority (H.R. 1446) and congressional approval.
Several bills have been introduced that would authorize negotiations to establish free-
trade areas with APEC countries.  These include: S.138 and S.586 (with Chile) S.935
( with Australia), S.943 (with New Zealand), S.944 (with the Republic of Korea), and
H.R.1566 (with Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand).  H.Con.Res.73 requests that
during the APEC summit, the President, call for the release of all Chinese political
prisoners and Chinese ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.  H.Con.Res. 194 calls for APEC to allow participation by Taiwan’s President
Chen Shui-bian in the Shanghai Leader’s Meeting.  U.S. financial support for APEC
falls under the State Department’s budget (H.R.1646) under Contributions to
International Organizations and has been $601,000 per year.
Debate over trade liberalization under APEC also is likely to address whether
provisions dealing with labor and the environment should be included and whether the
United States would be able to respond to foreign country violations of labor or
environmental standards with economic sanctions.  U.S. participation in APEC also
touches on the broader U.S. debate over whether the United States should continue
to pursue the expansion of international trade and investment with other nations –
particularly through free trade agreements, the effect of trade and globalization on
import-sensitive industries, and whether increased trade threatens or enhances U.S.
prosperity, employment opportunities, and economic security.  The Bush
Administration has been approached by leaders from many other nations who desire
to pursue free trade agreements with the United States. USTR Zoellick stated that the
Administration will consider each of these offers seriously, while focusing on the Free
Trade Area of the Americas.  By moving on multiple fronts, he stated that the United
States could create a “competition in liberalization that will promote open markets in
the Western hemisphere and around the world.”3  The Bush Administration also
considers APEC to be important because of its role in promoting trade and investment
liberalization, increased transparency, openness, and predictability based on the rule
of law, and discussion among national leaders.  The Administration also is working
with the International Monetary Fund in fostering rapid Asian economic recovery
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which is thought to mean more exports for U.S. companies and more jobs for
Americans.4
The growth of regional free-trade arrangements in various parts of the world also
has generated proposals for other bilateral arrangements among APEC countries.5
Free trade or preferential trade agreements have been announced or are under
discussion among APEC members such as between Singapore and New Zealand,
Australia, Japan, Mexico, Canada, and Chile and between Japan and South Korea.
The ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan,
China, and South Korea are considering an Asian free trade bloc (ASEAN + 3) .
Since 1992, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been phasing
in a Free Trade Area (AFTA) for its members, although AFTA’s goal is currently to
lower tariffs overall and eliminate them only on certain items imported from other
member countries.
APEC Institutional Development
APEC began in 1989 as an Australian initiative in recognition of the growing
interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies and in response to the free-trade areas
which had developed in Europe and North America.  Originally intended to exclude
the United States and Canada, APEC was to provide an institution and forum for
consultation and coordination on economic issues of importance to East Asia and
Australia/New Zealand.  Ultimately, membership was opened to countries in the
Americas. 
Membership in APEC initially included twelve economies (Hong Kong and
Taiwan are not considered to be countries) but grew to twenty-one.  The founding
members were the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN (Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, but not Vietnam),
Australia, and New Zealand.  In 1991, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong joined.  In 1993, Mexico and Papua New Guinea were admitted, as was
Chile in 1994.  In 1997, APEC extended membership to Peru, Russia, and Vietnam
(who became members in 1998) and declared a ten-year period of consolidation
before additional membership applications would be considered.
The objectives of APEC are:
! to sustain growth and development of the region;
! to encourage the flow of goods, services, capital, and technology;
! to develop and strengthen the multilateral trading system; and
! to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services and investment.
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APEC’s principles of operation are:
! that APEC is a voluntary association in which participants do not
cede powers of regulation or enforcement to a supra-national
institution;
! that decisions are based on consensus; and
! that decisions are implemented by individual members on a voluntary
basis and by collective actions (the voluntary actions are coordinated
and aimed at accomplishing a common goal).
At the 1994 summit in Bogor, Indonesia, APEC leaders signed a declaration
setting the goal of free and open trade and investment in APEC.  The industrialized
economies (United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and
possibly others) are to achieve the goal by the year 2010 and the remaining economies
to do so by 2020.  The United States argued against allowing the additional 10 years
for developing economies, but this provision was retained primarily at the insistence
of China, South Korea, and Malaysia.  The Bogor Declaration is a consensus, not a
legal, document.
The APEC Structure and Activities
The APEC chair rotates annually and since 1989 has been held by Australia,
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, United States, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines,
Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Brunei.  China holds the chair in 2001.
The focal point of APEC activities is the annual Leaders Meeting in which the
APEC leaders set goals, publicize them, and provide momentum for the process.6
This is usually held in November of each year, and is attended by heads of state except
for those from Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) and Hong Kong who send other
representatives.  The major APEC decisions are affirmed and announced at this
meeting.  The summit also provides a platform for and gives momentum to major
APEC initiatives.  The Leaders’ meeting was begun in 1993 by former President
Clinton who invited the leaders to Blake Island near Seattle.  Although APEC
confines its agenda to economic issues, the heads of state at bilateral meetings
conducted before and after the Leader’s Meetings have discussed concerns over
international security, human rights, and other issues.
Most of the decisions of APEC are first considered in ministerial meetings.
These include the respective ministers dealing with trade, finance, transportation,
telecommunications, human resources development (education), energy, environment,
science and technology, and small and medium-sized enterprises.  The largest
ministerial is the annual Joint Ministerial Meeting which precedes the Leaders
Meeting.  It usually is attended by foreign and trade or commerce ministers from
member states.  Management of substance is handled under ministerial direction
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through Senior Officials Meetings (held four times per year).  In 1993, APEC
created a Secretariat in Singapore with an Executive Director, 23 officials seconded
by member economies for fixed terms and a similar number of locally recruited
support staff.  
Most of the specific tasks before APEC are being addressed in committees or
working groups or expert groups that deal with economic issues of importance to
the region.  For implementing the Bogor declaration, the Committee on Trade and
Investment plays the key role.  Other committees are the Economic Committee and
the Budget and Administrative Committee.  APEC also has ten working groups which
work on specific areas of cooperation and facilitation:  (1) Trade and Investment
Data, (2) Trade Promotion, (3) Industrial Science and Technology, (4) Human
Resources Development, (5) Energy Cooperation, (6) Marine Resource Conservation,
(7) Telecommunications, (8) Transportation, (9) Tourism, and (10) Fisheries.  Each
working group has one or more shepherds (members) who take responsibility for
coordinating the work of the group.
In 1992, APEC formed the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and charged it with
developing a “vision” for APEC’s future.  In 1994, the EPG recommended that APEC
establish the goal of free trade, and, in 1995, as it completed its work, it
recommended ways to achieve that vision.
In 1995, APEC established the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC)
which consists of up to three members appointed by each APEC member.  It provides
advice on implementing the APEC agenda and other specific business-related issues.7
For 2000, ABAC focused its activities on maintaining momentum in trade and
investment liberalization, building capacity in APEC financial systems, and improving
access to new opportunities through technological progress.  In 2001, ABAC is
expanding the work of its Action Plan Monitoring Committee and developing
recommendations from three task forces dealing, respectively, with finance,
technology, and trade and investment.
In 1995, the issue was raised of whether APEC should be expanded to include
consideration of regional security issues.  Until then, consideration of non-economic
issues was confined to bilateral summit meetings surrounding the Leaders Meetings.
APEC had carefully kept its distance from security matters for fear that such issues
would cause divisions within the group — particularly among China, Taiwan, the
United States, Japan, and Russia.  Such divisions could thwart cooperation in
achieving economic goals.  The consensus in 1995 among APEC members seemed to
be that regional security issues should be discussed in the ASEAN Regional Forum
and other fora rather than in APEC.8  The ASEAN Regional Forum usually meets
after the ASEAN Ministerial Conference and, in addition to the seven members of
ASEAN, includes the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Australia,
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New Zealand, Canada, and the European Union.  It provides the largest pan-Pacific
forum for discussing security issues.
The 1995 Osaka Action Agenda
Before 1995, APEC declarations and other documents were general statements
without specifics on measures to be taken.  In 1995 at the meetings in Osaka, Japan,
APEC members agreed to an Action Agenda that was intended to translate into reality
the aims of APEC ) particularly the 1994 Bogor Declaration of achieving free trade
and investment among its member economies by the year 2010 or 2020.9
The Osaka Action Agenda is the template adopted for APEC work to
accomplish its three goals of:  (1) trade and investment liberalization, (2) trade and
investment facilitation, and (3) economic and technical cooperation.  The Agenda laid
out nine general principles for members to follow in devising a road map to reach
APEC’s free-trade goal. These general principles have been used to guide individual
APEC members in devising national Action Plans for submission at subsequent
meetings.
The general principles in the Action Plan included (1) comprehensiveness [all
impediments are to be included], (2) WTO-consistency [consistent with World Trade
Organization rules], (3) comparability [comparable actions with consideration for
different starting points], (4) non-discrimination [benefits to be accorded to all APEC
members and also to non-APEC countries], (5) transparency [in domestic trade laws
and regulations], (6) standstill [no increased protection], (7) simultaneous start-
continuous process-differentiated time tables [all start together in a continuous
process to achieve long-term goal], (8) flexibility [in dealing with issues arising from
liberalization )  a controversial principle that some argue allows for import-sensitive
sectors to be liberalized more slowly], and (9) cooperation [to pursue economic and
technical cooperation].
The Agenda also outlined actions that APEC economies were to take in fifteen
specific areas.  These included both actions by individual members and collectively by
APEC in tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, investment, standards, customs
procedures, intellectual property rights, competition policy, and dispute mediation.
  Each APEC member also announced initial actions for liberalization and
facilitation of trade and investment.  These actions represented the first wide-ranging
initiatives of APEC members to speed up implementing their Uruguay Round
commitments.
Since Japan hosted the 1995 APEC meetings in Osaka, it held the Chair and the
responsibility to ensure that the APEC process of trade and investment liberalization
continued.  Japan, however, took this opportunity to lead a group (including South
Korea, China, and Taiwan) of members who argued for a weak definition of
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comprehensiveness10 and insisted on including a general principle of flexibility that
might allow the country to placate certain import-sensitive sectors (particularly
agriculture) by putting them on a slower timetable or possibly even excluding them
from complete liberalization.  The United States and twelve APEC members viewed
the principle of comprehensiveness (coverage of all sectors) as vital to achieving the
Bogor vision of free trade in APEC.  In Osaka, APEC members reached a
compromise that allowed the comprehensiveness principle to remain unchanged but
added the principle of flexibility.11
At Osaka, Malaysia also argued for making all APEC commitments “voluntary”
(meaning that the free-trade target dates would not be binding).  For the Bogor
Declaration in 1994, Malaysia had attached its objections to establishing the goal of
free trade and investment by the year 2010 or 2020.  As a compromise, the word
“voluntary” was added.  The Osaka Leaders’ Declaration stated APEC’s resolve to
“encourage...the evolving efforts of voluntary liberalization in the region,” but the
Osaka Action Agenda clearly declared under the comprehensiveness principle that
“the APEC liberalization and facilitation process will be comprehensive, addressing
all impediments to achieving the long-term goal of free and open trade and
investment.”12
APEC members also disagreed over the non-discrimination principle or what
has been termed “open regionalism.”  Japan has pressed for the benefits of APEC
trade liberalization to be accorded even non-APEC trading partners on a most-
favored-nation basis.  Japan’s government had stated that it thought APEC should not
be a trading bloc that discriminates against outsiders.  The problem with such
unilateral trade liberalization, however, is that it invites free riders and makes
generating public support difficult.  The United States favored benefits to be accorded
non-APEC countries on a reciprocal basis which has been the basis for other
negotiations.13  In practice, APEC agreements have gone to the WTO for binding and
global implementation with non-APEC members.
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The 1996 Manila Action Plan
For the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in the Philippines in November 1996, the theme
was “from vision to action” meaning that APEC members were taking measures to
realize the goal of free and open trade and investment in the region.  The APEC
leaders:
! launched the implementation phase of the free and open trade and
investment agenda,
! delivered business facilitation measures,
! agreed to advance common goals in the World Trade Organization,
! developed ways to strengthen economic and technical cooperation,
and
! engaged the business sector as a full partner in the APEC process.14
In concrete terms, the first task was to coordinate the individual and collective
initiatives into a Manila Action Plan for APEC.  This contained the first steps of an
evolutionary process of progressive and comprehensive trade and investment
liberalization toward achieving the goals in the Bogor Declaration and in accord with
the Osaka Action Agenda.
APEC took each of the Individual Action Plans (IAP) by member economies and
categorized them according to the fifteen issue areas set forth in the Osaka Action
Plan.  Although the APEC process relies on concerted unilateral liberalization and
does not formally evaluate each IAP, there was considerable pressure placed on
countries whose plans fell short.  One of the principles of the process is comparability
— which means no free riding.
The APEC leaders also announced that APEC supported an Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) that was then passed on to the WTO for global
consideration and broader support.  The agreement grew out of recommendations
from industry groups in 1995 to the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations.  It
was endorsed by U.S. and European corporate executives at a November 1995
Transatlantic Business Dialogue, further endorsed by the United States and European
Union at the Madrid Summit in December 1995, and then supported by the
Quadrilateral (U.S., EU, Canada, and Japan) Trade Ministers and the G-7 in 1996
before APEC decided to support it in November 1996.  By the time it was considered
(and adopted) by the WTO in December 1996, 14 states or customs territories were
prepared to sign the agreement. The ITA provides for zero tariffs in more than 92%
of information technology trade among its 39 signatory nations.  The tariff reductions
were phased in over the 1997-2000 period, although developing country participants
have been granted extended periods for some products.15   APEC played a key role
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in generating support for this initiative among the newly industrializing Asia-Pacific
nations.
The 1997 Vancouver Meetings – the Manila
Framework
The 1997 Ministerial and Leaders Meetings took place in November in
Vancouver, British Columbia.  As the leaders met, several of the Asian APEC
members were coping with severe financial crises in which the value of their
currencies had plummeted, the value of stocks on their equity markets had dropped,
and many of their financial institutions had become insolvent.16  The International
Monetary Fund had already arranged support packages for Thailand and Indonesia
and was in the process of doing the same for South Korea.
While the APEC professionals considered the Asian financial crisis a diversion
from the APEC agenda for trade and investment liberalization, it added a dimension
to a Leaders Meeting that would otherwise have been a rather humdrum event.  Prior
to the summit, the APEC finance ministers had met in Manila and developed a
framework to deal with currency and other financial crises.  The ministers rejected a
Japanese-backed proposal to establish a separate Asian fund to provide financial
support for countries coping with financial difficulties.  The Manila Framework was
endorsed by the APEC leaders.
The Manila framework included three elements.  The first was a strong domestic
response by each country involved to create an economic environment that can attract
capital and maintain confidence ) including to strengthen its banking system.  The
second was a stronger response by the IMF that included adequate financial support
up front to ease any liquidity crisis and to provide the confidence necessary to avoid
instability.  The third was a cooperative financing mechanism through which the
countries of the region would, on a case-by-case basis, backstop IMF financial
measures to ensure that adequate resources were available.17
At the APEC summit, the leaders also designated fifteen major sectors where the
principal goal would be to achieve free trade (tariff elimination) within a short span
of years but not later than the year 2005.  This represented a restricted, but
nevertheless significant, advance on the Bogor Declaration.  Detailed market-opening
plans were to be concluded by the first half of 1998 with the aim of beginning
implementation in 1999.  These Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL)
agreements would be patterned after the Information Technology Agreement
endorsed in 1996 at the Manila summit and later adopted by the WTO.  Of the fifteen
sectors, nine were chosen for action.  Of these nine, six had been nominated by the
United States.  The nine sectors were: environmental goods and services, energy
sector, fish and fish products, toys,  forest products, gems and jewelry, medical
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equipment and instruments, chemicals, and a telecommunications mutual recognition
arrangement.18
Although these EVSL initiatives were begun by APEC, APEC members agreed
to send them to the WTO in order to seek participation by the EU and other nations
and to make the commitments binding.  At the WTO, except for the
telecommunications mutual recognition arrangement, the liberalization of these
sectors has became entangled in the proposal for a new round of trade negotiations,
and progress has stalled.
Each APEC member also submitted a 1997 Individual Action Plan that indicated
measures taken and outlined how it intended to move toward the Bogor targets.
Another area of focus for the 1997 APEC meetings was trade facilitation and other
measures to lower the costs of doing business in the region.  The ministers welcomed
the achievements under what are called Collective Action Plans that  lower costs and
reduce barriers to the movement of goods and services, capital, and business people.
They endorsed work in these areas, which included:  development of the Blueprint for
Customs Modernization; establishment of APEC Internet sites; progress on alignment
with international standards; increased transparency for acquiring and using
intellectual property rights; development of options to enhance the environment for
investment; development of model mutual recognition agreements; principles to guide
work on dispute mediation; improved mobility for business people (including the
APEC Business Travel Card); providing Internet access to member country tariff
rates; and development of guidelines for improving the tendering, approval, and
regulatory processes for independent power producers.19
The 1998 Malaysia Meetings – Sectoral
Liberalization
The 1998 APEC Joint Ministerial and Leaders’ Meetings were held in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.  Former President Clinton had announced his intention to attend,
but sent Vice President Gore in his place because of the imminent bombing of Iraq.
At the Malaysia meetings, APEC leaders gave support to Early Voluntary Sectoral
Liberalization (EVSL) at the WTO which would liberalize trade in nine key sectors
as APEC had proposed in the previous Leader’s Meeting.20
Two other issues dominated the APEC meetings in Malaysia.  The first was the
global economic turmoil that began in Asia in 1997.  APEC Leaders declared that
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they needed to deal urgently with the financial crisis and committed themselves to
pursuing a cooperative growth strategy with the following dimensions:
! Growth-oriented prudent macroeconomic policies, appropriate to the
specific requirements of each of their economies;
! Expanded financial assistance from the international community to
generate employment and to build and strengthen social safety nets
to protect the poor and vulnerable;
! A comprehensive program of support for efforts to strengthen
financial systems, restore trade finance, and accelerate corporate
sector restructuring;
! New approaches to catalyze the return of stable and sustainable
private capital flows into the region;
! A renewed commitment to the Bogor goals of achieving free and
open trade and investment within APEC; and
! Looking toward the longer-term, urgent work among themselves and
with other economies and institutions to develop and implement
measures to strengthen the international financial system.21
Prior to the APEC meetings, Japan had been urged by the United States and
other industrialized nations to stimulate its economy in order to restore domestic
demand-led growth, clean up its banking system, further open its markets, deregulate
its economy, and do more to help its neighboring countries in crisis.  In the weeks
leading up to the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, Japan did take three measures aimed at
restoring its moribund economy and promoting growth in east Asian countries.  It
announced a stimulus package (its eighth in the 1990s) of public spending and tax cuts
worth about $196 billion,22 unveiled what it called the Miyazawa Initiative — a
package of support measures by the Japanese government totaling $30 billion to assist
economic recovery in Asian countries,23 and, jointly with the United States,
announced a new $10 billion multilateral initiative aimed at revitalizing private sector
growth in Asia.24
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Another issue had high visibility at the meetings in Malaysia.  Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who hosted the APEC meetings, had been a severe
critic of the APEC trade liberalization process.  As the Asian financial crisis battered
the Malaysian economy, Mahathir imposed currency controls and restrictions on
capital flows to and from Malaysia and stifled dissent within the country.25  The
capital restrictions were in conflict with the goal of free trade and investment in APEC
but had attracted sympathy from other nations that had suffered the flight of short-
term capital.  Mahathir also had his former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim
(who had opposed Mahathir and certain of his policies) arrested on a “morals charge.”
In October 1998, Reps. Ben Gilman and Doug Bereuter urged President Clinton to
seek a new venue for the November APEC summit because his attendance in Malaysia
might be perceived as an endorsement of the “anti-free market measures” put in place
by that country and as a signal that the United States approved of the arrest of Anwar
Ibrahim.26  At the APEC summit, no bilateral meetings had been scheduled between
President Clinton and Prime Minister Mahathir, and Clinton’s non-attendance because
of Iraq had an additional muting effect.  While in Malaysia for the Joint Ministerial
Meeting, then Secretary of State Albright met with the wife of the jailed former
Deputy Prime Minister, and in a speech at a banquet hosted by Prime Minister
Mahathir, then Vice President Gore voiced sympathy for Malaysia’s pro-democracy
forces.  Both of these actions brought strong negative reactions from Malaysian
officials.27
The 1999 New Zealand Summit – End of Financial
Crisis
On September 12-13, 1999, the Seventh APEC Leaders Meeting was held in
Auckland, New Zealand.  The 1999 APEC meetings occurred earlier than their usual
time because the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference was to be held
in Seattle on November 30-December 3, 1999.  APEC wanted to complete its
recommendations for the WTO with enough time for them to be considered for the
WTO Conference.  The APEC leaders endorsed the launching of a new WTO round
of multilateral trade negotiations and agreed that the new round of trade negotiations
should:  (1) include industrial tariffs as well as mandated negotiations on services and
agriculture, (2) lead to timely and effective improvements in market access to the
benefit of all participants, particularly developing countries, (3) have a balanced and
sufficiently broad-based agenda, and (4) be concluded within three years as a single
package but which would not preclude the possibility of early results on a provisional
basis.  For the new WTO round, the APEC leaders also: (5) supported the abolition
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of agricultural export subsidies and unjustifiable export restrictions, (6) agreed that
the current moratorium on duties on electronic commerce should be extended, and (7)
endorsed efforts to achieve an agreement on transparency in government
procurement.  The leaders also agreed to continue working on the remaining eight
sectors designated for accelerated tariff liberalization (EVSL) in the WTO with the
goal (not attained) of completed agreements in 1999.28
 The problem of Japan’s protection of its rice farmers arose at APEC 99.  Japan
and some other APEC members insisted that APEC support the position in the WTO
trade negotiations that the agreements for all sectors be concluded in one package
rather than have separate sectoral agreements implemented after they were concluded.
The United States preferred separate sectoral agreements in order that the eight
sectors designated for early voluntary sectoral liberalization by APEC in 1998 and
other action on freeing trade in certain sectors could go forward without waiting for
the end of the WTO trade round.  Japan, however, was under pressure from its
farmers not to open its rice market.  It reportedly felt that the more products that
were covered by the negotiations, the less attention would be drawn to its high rice
import tariffs.29  Also, by not allowing agreements in sectors to go forward before the
conclusion of the round, proponents of the “single package” theory reportedly felt
that there would be less chance that an agreement on agriculture could be concluded
early.
The APEC summit occurred at a time of increasing violence in East Timor
following its vote for independence from Indonesia.  APEC leaders took advantage
of bilateral meetings with each other to put pressure on Indonesia to allow
international peacekeepers into the country.  While APEC was in session, Indonesian
President Habibie bowed to international concerns and agreed to allow a United
Nations peacekeeping force into East Timor.30
The APEC summit also occurred when the Asian economies appeared to be
recovering from the economic crisis that had beset the region and certain other
nations of the world since July 1997.  As Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, South
Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and other Asian countries dropped into recession, their
enthusiasm for further opening of their markets had waned.  However, with the
exception of Indonesia, the APEC economies seemed to have turned the corner, and
there was heightened recognition that open, transparent, and well-governed markets
were key to a return to sustained economic growth and prosperity.  The general
assessment of APEC’s ability to cope with the Asian financial crisis, however, seemed
to be that APEC really did little substantive work and that the International Monetary
Fund, World Bank, the U.S. Treasury, and other players in international financial
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markets carried the burden of coping with the crisis.31  In order to bring APEC finance
ministers more into the mainstream of APEC activities, the finance ministerial meeting
was moved to the period immediately preceding the Leaders meeting.
At New Zealand , the meeting between President Clinton and China’s President
Jiang, Zemin gave impetus to talks on China’s accession to the WTO which had been
suspended following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
The two also discussed Taiwan’s alleged “pro-independence gambit”and North Korea
and human rights issues.32 
The 2000 Brunei Summit – Toward Bilateral FTAs
On November 15-16, 2000, the Eighth APEC Leaders’ Meeting was held in
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei.  During the bilateral meeting with Singapore, the
United States and Singapore announced that they would begin negotiations on a
bilateral free trade agreement.33  Given the stalled start of the WTO multilateral
negotiations, more and more countries were opting to proceed with bilateral free trade
agreements.  During other bilateral meetings, the United States, New Zealand,
Singapore, Brunei, and Chile agreed in principle to an “open skies” pact (eliminating
restrictions on airline flights, prices, and routes among themselves),34 and the U.S. and
China announced that China would ban certain missile-related exports in exchange for
a lifting of U.S. sanctions prohibiting Chinese launches of American satellites.35
In the Brunei summit, the APEC leaders reaffirmed their determination to realize
the goal of free and open trade and investment among member economies and agreed
on the need to expeditiously launch a new round of trade negotiations under the
World Trade Organization in 2001.  In a concession to developing country members
(particularly Malaysia), the leaders called for a balanced and sufficiently broad-based
agenda that would respond to the interests and concerns of all WTO members to be
finalized as soon as possible in 2001.  The APEC communique also stated that China
should be accepted into the WTO soon, followed by Taiwan and sometime later by
Russia and Vietnam; that the people in every economy should have access to
information and services offered via the Internet by 2010; and that countries
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recovering from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis should keep up with painful
economic reforms even though their economies now are recovering.36
Policy Assessment and Implications
Trade liberalization under APEC is nowhere near as far along as that under either
the European Union or the North America Free Trade Agreement.  APEC’s goal of
free trade is to be phased in over the next two decades.  Only the framework now
exists to lead APEC members toward that goal.  APEC is not a negotiating body nor
are its decisions legally binding on its members.  The APEC process has been called
“concerted unilateral action” in which a set of principles and guidelines are agreed to
by APEC members and used to steer individual member actions.  Rather than a trade
bloc, APEC can be characterized as a building block toward greater trade
liberalization and cooperation not only within the organization, itself, but in broader
contexts, such as in the World Trade Organization.  The APEC work programs are
conducted on the basis of open dialogue with equal respect for the views of all
participants – both the member countries and, to a certain extent, private business
interests.  This consensus-based decision making, however, tends to be slow and
cumbersome.
When APEC began, many thought it would be just another “talk shop.”  The
movement in APEC toward voluntary free trade and investment liberalization,
however, has gone beyond initial expectations and seems to reflect a change in world
economic circumstances and attitudes.  The nations belonging to the WTO already
have agreed to reduce tariffs and eliminate most non-tariff barriers.  For the
industrialized nations, in particular, tariffs already are so low in many sectors that
some argue that dropping them entirely would make little difference.  Until the onset
of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, many nations were discovering the advantages
of free trade and unfettered foreign investment in today’s fast moving, consumer-
oriented markets.  A perception was developing that closed markets and unfriendly
investment climates can cause economies to lose rather than create employment
opportunities.  Since the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis and ensuing slow down in
economic growth, however, some nations are taking a second look at the costs as well
as advantages of free trade and capital flows — particularly short-term capital flows
between wealthy and developing economies. 
In terms of U.S. interests, APEC promotes trade and cooperation among
economies that have been the most dynamic in the world, encourages open trading
systems rather than trading blocs, helps U.S. businesses remain engaged in the region,
and provides the Asia-Pacific region with a counterweight to the European Union.
In response to APEC, the European Union in 1996 initiated ASEM, the Asia-Europe
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Meeting, which excludes the Americas.37  At the same time, countries in the Americas
are pursuing the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) a free-trade arrangement
that would stretch from Canada to Chile.38
Critics of APEC include those who (1) assert that liberalized trade and
investment has been primarily a one-way street that benefits trading partners more
than the United States; (2) are concerned that the U.S. President should not be
meeting annually with the heads of state of countries with alleged human rights
problems (for example, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam), and (3) place higher priority
on environmental considerations than trade.  
Some import sensitive sectors also have opposed further opening of U.S.
markets and more free trade agreements.  They fear that APEC free trade could
become a two-edged sword.  U.S. firms could gain greater access to Asian and South
American markets, but exporters from those regions also would gain more access to
U.S. markets.  There are concerns that this could hurt previously protected American
industries, such as  apparel, agriculture, steel, and motor vehicles (notably, pickup
trucks).  Some in these import-sensitive industries have opposed liberalized imports
from Asia and Latin America.  Also, in light of the intense opposition from some in
the United States concerning granting China the trade privileges of normal-trade-
relations (most-favored-nation) status and allowing it to join the World Trade
Organization, the question remains of how Americans would respond to establishing
free trade with that nation.  Furthermore, given the hidden barriers to trade and
investment in countries like Japan (close business relationships, interlocking corporate
organizations, etc.), some have questioned whether free trade with Japan might be a
one-way street.  Would Japanese exporters gain unlimited access to the U.S. market,
while American exporters still would face a web of private trade barriers in Japan?
APEC is maturing as an organization and has now drawn most major players in
the Asia-Pacific region into its membership.  Its long-range goals are lofty, but it
seems to be moving steadily toward achieving them.  It is becoming a credible vehicle
to discuss and coordinate issues in the region as well as to achieve trade and
investment liberalization. The Asian financial crisis dampened enthusiasm for further
opening of markets, but the crisis also underlined the need for market discipline in
allocating financial resources.  Market discipline occurs partly through liberalized
trade and capital flows.
The Individual Action Plans that are to bring the member economies closer to
the APEC goal of free trade and investment in the region contain many significant
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actions.  Most tariff reductions, however, reflect what member governments already
are committed to do in the World Trade Organization.  Some regulations have been
changed in response to APEC efforts, but for most countries, only a few actions to
reduce tariffs or ease foreign investment requirements have been taken specifically to
achieve the APEC goals. The time has arrived, however, when APEC members will
have to consider concrete measures that go beyond those already scheduled in order
to achieve the goals of the Bogor Declaration.
The sectors designated for early voluntary trade liberalization at the 1998 APEC
summit have been one way of going beyond the WTO commitments, although this
sectoral liberalization effort has been stalled at the WTO.  Another strategy that has
been suggested would be to adopt the APEC goals of free trade by the year 2010 or
2020 as a goal for the next round of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO.
This would put the rest of the WTO members on the same timetable as those in
APEC.  If the WTO members were to adopt this APEC goal, many of the problems
now being debated within APEC would be solved.  This includes the question of
whether APEC trade and investment liberalization also would apply to non-APEC
nations and whether APEC is to become an exclusive trading bloc.39  The WTO,
however, includes more countries than does APEC.  This makes reaching a consensus
to pursue such a goal more difficult and more unlikely to be to be achieved quickly.
The WTO also is attempting to pursue its own agenda for future negotiations.40
Another strategy that countries are pursuing to go beyond their WTO obligations
is to negotiate free-trade agreements with other APEC members.  In view of the
difficulty in launching a new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO
and the slow progress under APEC, many individual members are electing to go down
the route of bilateral free trade agreements.
On the other hand, within the United States, those who question the expansion
of international trade and investment often argue that the U.S. should not pursue more
free-trade arrangements because of human rights, economic, and other concerns.
Import-sensitive industries are among those who often oppose granting other nations
greater access to U.S. markets.  They also are less interested in access to foreign
markets that might be accorded through trade and investment liberalization.
Controversy also continues over the extent to which environmental and labor
conditions should be included in such agreements.41  Anti-globalization protesters who
have directed their efforts mainly to oppose WTO, International Monetary Fund, and
World Bank activities also could oppose further trade liberalization under APEC.
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APEC is also facing the growing pains of any new organization.  Some of its
committees and working groups have overlapping interests.  The number of meetings
is increasing, and travel requirements are rising for participants.  Still, it has, so far,
avoided forming a large bureaucracy such as those in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development or the European Union.  Also, it has expanded its
scope to address financial problems as well as trade and investment.
For the United States, a problem related to APEC is that the U.S. merchandise
trade balance with the APEC member economies has been deteriorating.  This can be
attributed mostly to U.S. macroeconomic conditions, but the political repercussions
in the United States from this rising trade deficit could combine with specific trade
disputes to have a negative impact on overall trade relations with some of the APEC
countries such as China and Japan.
Figure 1 shows U.S. bilateral merchandise trade balances with the members of
APEC.  As can be seen, the largest deficits are with Japan, China, Canada, and
Mexico, all important APEC members.  Out of a total U.S. merchandise trade deficit
of $436.5 billion in 2000, $285.2 billion was attributed to just seven APEC partner
nations – five in Asia (China, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea) plus two
in North America (Canada and Mexico).  The total U.S. trade imbalance with APEC
reached $306.4 billion in 2000.  Three-quarters of the imbalance in U.S. trade with
the world, therefore, is with APEC.  To the extent that the bilateral trade deficits with
APEC countries are being exacerbated by trade barriers that are hindering access to
their markets, trade liberalization under APEC may work to increase U.S. exports to
those economies and reduce certain bilateral trade deficits.  A lessening of a bilateral
trade deficit through greater access to foreign markets, however, would tend to
change the composition and distribution of the deficit and not necessarily reduce the
overall deficit by a corresponding amount.
APEC also raises some fundamental questions for U.S. policy.  One is whether
a U.S. consensus can be achieved on the APEC vision of free trade and investment
in the Asia Pacific region or whether future trade liberalization will be confined
primarily to bilateral free-trade arrangements and multilateral trade negotiations under
the WTO.  Another question is whether the U.S. business community will continue
to back the APEC process or whether they view the APEC goals of free trade and
investment in the region as too long-term and too lofty to be actually achieved.  A
further question is whether trade promotion (fast-track) authority should be provided
to the President that would cover negotiations under APEC. A final question is
whether APEC is worth the effort and resources being devoted to it and whether the
United States should continue to participate in it.  These questions await a
comprehensive domestic policy debate over APEC that is yet to occur.
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Figure 1.  U.S. Merchandise Trade Balances with APEC Members
2000
